ACROSS THE EUROPEAN continent, the revolutions of 1848 had failed. The forces of liberalism and nationalism appeared to have been decisively defeated as authoritarian governments reestablished their control almost everywhere in Europe by 1850. And yet within twenty-five years, many of the goals sought by the liberals and nationalists during the first half of the nineteenth century seemed to have been achieved. National unity became a reality in Italy and Germany, and many European states were governed by constitutional monarchies, even though the constitutional-parliamentary features were frequently façades.
All the same, these goals were not achieved by liberal and nationalist leaders but by a new generation of conservative leaders who were proud of being practitioners of Realpolitik (ray-AHL-poh-lee-teek), the “politics of reality.” One reaction to the failure of the revolutions of 1848 had been a new toughness of mind as people prided themselves on being realistic in their handling of power. The new conservative leaders used armies and power politics to achieve their foreign policy goals. And they did not hesitate to manipulate liberal means to achieve conservative ends at home. Nationalism had failed as a revolutionary movement in 1848-1849, but between 1850 and 1871, these new leaders found a variety of ways to pursue nation building. Winning wars was one means of nation building, but these rulers also sought to improve the economy and foster cultural policies that gave the citizens of their states a greater sense of national identity.
One of the most successful of these new conservative leaders was the Prussian Otto von Bismarck, who used both astute diplomacy and war to achieve the unification of Germany. On January 18, 1871, Bismarck and six hundred German princes, nobles, and generals filled the Hall of Mirrors in the palace of Versailles, outside Paris. The Prussian army had defeated the French, and the assembled notables were gathered for the proclamation of the Prussian king as the new emperor of a united German state. When the words “Long live His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor William!” rang out, the assembled guests took up the cry. One participant wrote, “A thundering cheer, repeated at least six times, thrilled through the room while the flags and standards waved over the head of the new emperor of Germany.” European rulers who feared the power of the new German state were not so cheerful. “The balance of power has been entirely destroyed,” declared the British prime minister.
After 1850, a new generation of conservative leaders came to power in Europe. Foremost among them was Napoleon III (1852-1870) of France, who taught his contemporaries how authoritarian governments could use liberal and nationalistic forces to bolster their own power. It was a lesson others quickly learned.
Even after his election as the president of the French Republic in 1848, many of his contemporaries dismissed “Napoleon the Small” as a nonentity whose success was due only to his name. But Louis Napoleon was a clever politician who was especially astute at understanding the popular forces of his day. After his election, he was clear about his desire to have personal power. He wrote, “I shall never submit to any attempt to influence me.... I follow only the promptings of my mind and heart . . . . Nothing, nothing shall trouble the clear vision of my judgment or the strength of my resolution.”
Louis Napoleon was a patient man. For three years, he persevered in winning the support of the French people, and when the National Assembly rejected his wish to revise the constitution and be allowed to stand for reelection, Louis used troops to seize control of the government on December 1, 1851. After restoring universal male suffrage, Louis Napoleon asked the French people to restructure the government by electing him president for ten years (see the box on p. 659). By an overwhelming majority, 7.5 million yes votes to 640,000 no votes, they agreed. A year later, on November 21, 1852, Louis Napoleon returned to the people to ask for the restoration of the empire. This time, 97 percent responded affirmatively, and on December 2, 1852, Louis Napoleon assumed the title of Napoleon III (the first Napoleon had abdicated in favor of his son, Napoleon II, on April 6, 1814). The Second Empire had begun.
The government of Napoleon III was clearly authoritarian in a Bonapartist sense. Louis Napoleon had asked, “Since France has carried on for fifty years only by virtue of the administrative, military, judicial, religious and financial organization of the Consulate and Empire, why should she not also adopt the political institutions of that period?” As chief of state, Napoleon III controlled the armed forces, police, and civil service. Only he could introduce legislation and declare war. The Legislative Corps gave an appearance of representative government since its members were elected by universal male suffrage for six-year terms. But they could neither initiate legislation nor affect the budget.
EARLY DOMESTIC POLICIES The first five years of Napoleon III’s reign were a spectacular success as he reaped the benefits of worldwide economic prosperity as well as of some of his own economic policies. Napoleon believed in using the resources of government to stimulate the national economy and took many steps to encourage industrial growth. Government subsidies were used to foster the construction of railroads, harbors, roads, and canals. The major French railway lines were completed during Napoleon’s reign, and industrial expansion was evident in the tripling of iron production. In his concern to reduce tensions and improve the social welfare of the nation, Napoleon provided hospitals and free medicine for the workers and advocated better housing for the working class.
In the midst of this economic expansion, Napoleon III undertook a vast reconstruction of the city of Paris. Under the direction of Baron Haussmann (HOWSS-mun), the medieval Paris of narrow streets and old city walls was destroyed and replaced by a modern Paris of broad boulevards, spacious buildings, circular plazas, public squares, an underground sewage system, a new public water supply, and gaslights (see Chapter 23 ). The new Paris served a military as well as an aesthetic purpose: broad streets made it more difficult for would be insurrectionists to throw up barricades and easier for troops to move rapidly through the city to put down revolts.
LIBERALIZATION of THE REGIME In the 1860s, as opposition to some of the emperor’s policies began to mount, Napoleon III liberalized his regime. He reached out to the working class by legalizing trade unions and granting them the right to strike. He also began to liberalize the political process. The Legislative Corps had been closely controlled during the 1850s. In the 1860s, opposition candidates were allowed greater freedom to campaign, and the Legislative Corps was permitted more say in affairs of state, including debate over the budget. Initially, Napoleon’s liberalization policies served to strengthen the government. In a plebiscite in May 1870 on whether to accept a new constitution that might have inaugurated a parliamentary regime, the French people gave Napoleon another resounding victory. This triumph was short-lived, however. Foreign policy failures led to growing criticism, and war with Prussia in 1870 turned out to be the death blow for Napoleon III’s regime (see “The Franco-Prussian War” later in this chapter).
Napoleon III was considerably less accomplished at dealing with foreign policy, especially his imperialistic adventure in Mexico. Seeking to dominate Mexican markets for French goods, the emperor sent French troops to Mexico in 1861 to join British and Spanish forces in protecting their interests in the midst of the upheaval caused by a struggle between liberal and conservative Mexican factions. Although the British and Spanish withdrew their troops after order had been restored, French forces remained, and in 1864, Napoleon III installed Archduke Maximilian of Austria, his handpicked choice, as the new emperor of Mexico. When the French troops were needed in Europe, Maximilian became an emperor without an army. He surrendered to liberal Mexican forces in May 1867 and was executed in June. His execution was a blow to the prestige of the French emperor.
Napoleon III’s participation in the Crimean War (1854-1856) had been more rewarding. As heir to the Napoleonic empire, Napoleon III was motivated by the desire to free France from the restrictions of the peace settlements of 1814-1815 and to make France the chief arbiter of Europe. In the decline of the Ottoman Empire, he saw an opportunity to take steps toward these goals.
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE The Crimean War was yet another attempt to answer the Eastern Question: Who would be the chief beneficiaries of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire? In the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire had controlled southeastern Europe, but in 1699 it had lost Hungary, Transylvania, Croatia, and Slovenia to the expanding Austrian Empire. The Russian Empire to its north also encroached on the Ottoman Empire by seizing the Crimea in 1783 and Bessarabia in 1812 (see Map 22.1).
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had entered a fresh period of decline. A nationalist revolt had gained independence for Greece in 1830. Serbia claimed autonomy in 1827, which was recognized by the Ottoman Empire in 1830. The Russians had obtained a protectorate over the Danubian provinces of Moldavia (mohl-DAYvee-uh) and Wallachia (wah-LAY-kee-uh) in 1829.
As Ottoman authority over the outlying territories in southeastern Europe waned, European governments began to take an active interest in the empire’s apparent demise. Russia’s proximity to the Ottoman Empire and the religious bonds between the Russians and the Greek Orthodox Christians in Ottoman-dominated southeastern Europe naturally gave it special opportunities to enlarge its sphere of influence. Other European powers not only feared Russian ambitions but also had objectives of their own in the area. Austria craved more land in the Balkans, a desire that inevitably meant conflict with Russia, and France and Britain were interested in commercial opportunities and naval bases in the eastern Mediterranean.
WAR IN THE CRIMEA War erupted between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1853 when the Russians demanded the right to protect Christian shrines in Palestine, a privilege that had already been extended to the French. When the Ottomans refused, the Russians occupied Moldavia and Wallachia. Failure to resolve the dispute by negotiations led the Ottoman Empire to declare war on Russia on October 4, 1853. The following year, on March 28, Great Britain and France declared war on Russia.
Why did Britain and France take that step? Concern over the prospect of an upset in the balance of power was clearly one reason. The British in particular feared that an aggressive Russia would try to profit from the obvious weakness of the Ottoman government by seizing Ottoman territory or the long-coveted Dardanelles. Such a move would make Russia the major power in eastern Europe and would enable the Russians to challenge British naval control of the eastern Mediterranean. Napoleon III felt that the Russians had insulted France, first at the Congress of Vienna and now by their insistence on replacing the French as the protectors of Christians living in the Ottoman Empire. The French also feared the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the growth of Russian influence there. Although the Russians assumed that they could count on support from the Austrians (since Russian troops had saved the Austrian government in 1849), the Austrian prime minister blithely observed, “We will astonish the world by our ingratitude,” and Austria remained neutral. Since the Austrians had perceived that it was not in their best interest to intervene, Russia had to fight alone.
Poorly planned and poorly fought, the Crimean War is perhaps best remembered for the suicidal charge of the British Light Brigade at the Battle of Balaklava (bal-uh-KLAH-vah). Britain and France decided to attack Russia’s Crimean peninsula in the Black Sea. After a long siege and at a terrible cost in manpower for both sides, the main Russian fortress of Sevastopol (suh-VAS-tuh-pohl) fell in September 1855, six months after the death of Tsar Nicholas 1. His successor, Alexander II, soon sued for peace. By the Treaty of Paris, signed in March 1856, Russia was forced to give up Bessarabia at the mouth of the Danube and accept the neutrality of the Black Sea. In addition, the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were placed under the protection of all five great powers.
The Crimean War proved costly to both sides. More than 250,000 soldiers died in the war, with 60 percent of the deaths coming from disease (especially cholera). Even more would have died on the British side if it had not been for the efforts of Florence Nightingale (1820-1910). Her insistence on strict sanitary conditions saved many lives and helped make nursing a profession of trained, middle-class women.
The Crimean War broke up long-standing European power relationships and effectively destroyed the Concert of Europe. Austria and Russia, the two chief powers maintaining the status quo in the first half of the nineteenth century, were now enemies because of Austria’s unwillingness to support Russia in the war. Russia, defeated, humiliated, and weakened by the obvious failure of its serf-armies, withdrew from European affairs for the next two decades to set its house in order. Great Britain, disillusioned by its role in the war, also pulled back from Continental affairs. Austria, paying the price for its neutrality, was now without friends among the great powers. Not until the 1870s were new combinations formed to replace those that had disappeared, and in the meantime, the European international situation remained fluid. Leaders who were willing to pursue the “politics of reality” found themselves in a situation rife with opportunity. It was this new international situation that made possible the unification of Italy and Germany.