AP European History
AP European History
Three aging states dominated central Europe in the 17th century-the Holy Roman Empire, Poland, and the Ottoman Empire. The weakness of these “soft states” – so-called because of their loose organization allowed for the emergence of a new constellation of powers. Following the Thirty Years’ War (1648), the Holy Roman Empire’s status as a loose confederation of over 300 German states was confirmed. The traditional rulers of the empire, the Austrian Habsburgs, turned east over the next century to enhance their power, particularly at the expense of the declining Ottoman Empire. Though Austria was able to gain significant swaths of land in east-central Europe, these conquests continued to bring more non-German minorities (Slavs, Poles, Italians, Romanians, and Ukrainians) into the empire, which later proved a centrifugal force, as nationalism took hold in the 19th century.
Poland was the weakest of the European kingdoms. Ironically, Poland had been in 1500 the largest nation in Europe. Throughout the 16th century, the powerful nobles of Poland – the szlachta, who made up almost 10% of the population – succeeded in limiting the power of the Polish kings. Eventually, the Polish monarchy evolved into an elective position, and one that was fought over by rival European powers, who bribed the noble-electors with promises of religious toleration and respect for their “liberties.” After 1587, the nation was ruled by only two native-born monarchs. Further, a single noble could block the actions of the Sejm, Poland’s representative body, by using the liberum veto. Poland’s experience ran counter to the larger trend toward absolutism, and unable to establish permanent taxes or a standing army, Poland fell prey to larger rivals. The tragic result of this failure to centralize for the formerly great kingdom was Poland’s Partition in 1795. After the Turks captured Constantinople in 1453, the Ottoman Empire periodically sent shock waves of fear throughout central Europe with an ebb and flow of expansion. In 1529, the Turks had nearly captured Vienna, but eventually fell back into internal turmoil for over a century, Once again, in 1683 the Turks besieged the Habsburg capital, which was rescued triumphantly by a multinational Holy League (led by the last great native Polish king, Jan Sobieski) at the Battle of Vienna. Never again would the Turks pose a major threat to central Europe. What had once been Ottoman strengths, now decayed; the empire simply did not keep up with rest of Europe. First, the Turkish rulers, the Sultans, grew corrupt from court intrigue, assassination plots, and sensuous living. Second, the once-great Janissaries, the elite fighters comprised of former Christians, became a static force opposed to technological and strategic change. Finally, though the Ottoman rulers tolerated religious minorities (more so than most European nations), the resulting tradition of local rule made it difficult to draw effectively on the resources of the empire’s far-flung provinces. Many states, such as France, desired the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire as a counterweight to the Austrian Habsburgs, but only if the Islamic state could be influenced and indirectly controlled from the outside.
Once the Austrian Habsburgs held off the Turkish invasion in 1683, they were able to turn the battle back toward their long-time enemies. Employing the talents of a castoff from the court of Louis XIV, Eugene of Savoy (1663-1736), the Austrians defeated the Turks, gaining back Hungary and adding Transylvania, as well as territory in the Balkan Peninsula, by treaty (1699). Austria needed to end the Turkish conflict so as to turn their attention to the impending War of Spanish Succession (see above): Though the Austrians were unable to reunite the two Habsburg branches (Spanish and Austrian) during the conflict, the Peace of Utrecht (1713-1714) granted them territory in the Netherlands and Italy. The reign of Emperor Charles VI (1711-1740) was dominated by one issue: ensuring the succession of his daughter and heir, Maria Theresa (1740-1780), to the many Habsburg lands. To this effect, Charles negotiated the Pragmatic Sanction with Europe’s rulers, whereby they agreed to respect the Habsburg inheritance to a female ruler. Given the circumstances, Austria adjusted effectively after its losses in the Thirty Years’ War, but as we’ll see in the next chapter, the succession issue would ultimately cost the Habsburgs their dominant position in central Europe.
The rise of Brandenburg-Prussia (later simply Prussia) in the 17th century was a surprise. A scattered nation with a small population (2 million in 1650) and few natural resources, Prussia relied heavily on three factors for its amazing rise to power: 1) skillful and resolute leadership from the Hohenzollern dynasty, 2) efficient use of resources, and, most importantly, 3) an outstanding military tradition. As was often joked, “Prussia is not a state with an army, but an army with a state.” For no other nation was the military so closely associated with its power and prestige.
Brandenburg stood in the middle of north-central Germany, of importance only as an Elector of the Holy Roman Emperor. However, in 1618 the Hohenzollerns inherited the Duchy of Prussia, so far east that it was surrounded by Poland. During the Thirty Years’ War, Brandenburg experienced widespread devastation, its capital city of Berlin reduced to a village of rubble. Nonetheless, Brandenburg-Prussia gained territory in the west along the Rhine and in Pomerania as a result of the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Frederick William, the Great Elector (1640-1688), resolved that his nation would never again be overrun by invading armies.
Frederick William was the first in a line of great Prussian rulers. To gain the support of the Prussian nobility (the Junkers) Frederick William granted them important positions in the army and allowed them almost complete power over their serfs. In exchange, the aristocracy agreed to accept Hohenzollern leadership and an excise tax to fund the activities of the state. With these funds, Frederick William erected the skeleton of the Prussian state. To collect the taxes, Frederick William created the General War Commissariat, which at first provisioned the army but evolved into a state bureaucracy, famous for its punctuality and efficiency. The Hohenzollern rulers generally lived a Spartan existence, allowing most of the state’s revenues to flow into the army. Though Frederick William enhanced the army to 40,000 men, his goal was not to use it for conquest, but for security and as the glue that held scattered Prussia together. In addition, Frederick William practiced mercantilism by establishing monopolies, raising tariffs on imported goods, and promoting economic development. When Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes, the Prussian state welcomed the persecuted Huguenots, eager to cash in on their economic skills.
During the War of Spanish Succession, the Habsburg emperor called on the support of Brandenburg-Prussia to drive out the French from Germany. As a reward for his support, the duke of Brandenburg-Prussia earned himself a new title-king In Prussia. The first great king of Prussia proved to be Frederick William I (1713-1740), not to be confused with Frederick William, the Great Elector. Frederick William’s personality and approach to governing were strict, paternalistic, and austere. The ruler could be seen patrolling the streets of his realm with a walking stick, admonishing government officials or wayward citizens. Efficiency and duty took precedence over all else. State funds were used judiciously to augment the size of the army (up to 83,000) and often at the expense of the royal household budget. Frederick William introduced merit to government service, often promoting the middle class, though this by no means challenged the primary position of the Junkers or the army. However, Frederick William fought no wars in his reign. This feat he left for the son with whom he never got along, Frederick II.
To understand European diplomacy, you must grasp the importance of the balance of power. Balance-of-power politics developed during the Italian Renaissance but reached its most explicit form during the Age of Louis XIV. Louis’s desire to extend France to its “natural frontiers” (the Rhine River) and also accrue glory to himself led him into nearly constant warfare during his reign. As Spain continued its decline under the Habsburgs, France rushed in to exploit the vacuum of power in western Europe. In each of these wars, Louis animated a coalition of powers against him to prevent his threat to the balance of power, or the dominance of one nation over the rest. As you read over the wars below, focus on how the balance of power operates and shifts with each phase of conflict.
The first targets of Louis’s ambitions were the Spanish Netherlands and Dutch Republic, the latter whose commercial success he envied. This Dutch War earned Louis the strategic province of Franche-Comte (formerly Burgundy), which outflanked Alsace-Lorraine, his next target. Taking advantage of the growing weakness of the Holy Roman Empire, Louis in 1689 then invaded Alsace-Lorraine. The subsequent Nine Years’ War resulted in an anti-French alliance, also known as the League of Augsburg. Now both the stadholder of the Netherlands and king of England, William ill (of Orange) pieced together this coalition to prevent Louis’s bid for continental domination. Famines, sieges, and high taxes marked this desultory conflict, which ended in 1697 practically where it started, with Louis gaining only a few towns along his border. Bigger game awaited, as the Spanish monarch, Charles II, continued to decline in health, with no heir to the throne.
European royal houses had waited decades for the death of poor Charles II (1665-1700), the last Habsburg ruler of Spain and sad result of generations of interbreeding between the Spanish and Austrian Habsburg lines. Complicating matters, Louis XIV and the Holy Roman Emperor claimed the throne through family marriages to Charles’s sisters. Both contenders signed a treaty in 1700 to partition the Spanish Empire and thus maintain the balance of power. These plans fell to naught when Charles left a will in 1700 after his death granting all possessions to his nephew, Philip V, the Bourbon grandson of Louis XIV. Louis decided to press his claim to the Spanish throne via his grandson. The resulting War of Spanish Succession (1702-1713) proved to be the most costly, important, and last of Louis’s wars for continental domination. France and Spain faced off against England, the Netherlands, the Holy Roman Emperor, and a few smaller states. Warfare in the 18th century involved deliberate movements designed to outmaneuver opponents or capture strategic fortresses. The war dragged expensively on, as each nation – large and small – exploited the conflict to meet long-held territorial and political goals.
With the Peace of Utrecht in 1714 the conflict finally came to a close. Louis’s grandson Philip V (1700-1749) did become the Bourbon ruler of Spain, but it was a truncated empire that could never be united with its northern Bourbon neighbor of France. To recognize the weak:«r position of Spain, the 10 southern provinces of the Netherlands were given to Austria (now the Austrian Netherlands), as were former Spanish territories in Italy. The big winner of the conflict proved t<;> be England, which gained Gibraltar, a fortress at the opening of the Mediterranean, new territory in North America, and the privilege of trading with the Spanish Empire, known as the asiento. Britain’s Protestant succession was also confirmed, and it was poised, with a stable government and enhanced commercial position, to become the leading maritime power in Europe. As we’ll see below, other nations either emerged from the conflict with new found or curtailed power. However, the major consequences of the war and the treaty were to block Louis XIV’s last effort to impose French domination on the continent and to confirm the European state system of sovereign nations constantly shifting positions to maintain or create a balance of power. On his deathbed in 1715, Louis told his heir and great-grandson (the future Louis XV) that he feared he “had loved war too much.”